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This policy brief compares the European Union’s (EU) 
negotiating positions vis-à-vis the UK on Brexit with its 
positions vis-à-vis candidates which have started their 
accession negotiations, namely Turkey, Serbia and 
Montenegro, as well as the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM), whose candidacy represents a 
number of political aspects worth highlighting in the 
context of this paper. These two types of processes can 
be seen as reflections of each other: while the 
withdrawal talks with a member state are about how 
to become an ‘outsider’, the enlargement negotiations 
with the candidate countries are about how to make 
them ‘insiders’ of the EU political system. The Brexit 
negotiations seek to result in a new structured 
relationship between the EU and the future outsider, 
whereas the accession negotiations draw on an 
already structured relationship and aim at club 
membership as finalité. Such a comparison allows for 
testing the EU’s consistency and helps to reflect on 
whether lessons from one case can help resolve 
challenging issues in the other case. 
This policy brief will focus on the main debates in the 
Brexit negotiations, namely the rights of residents, 
access to the single market, the regulation of borders 
(notably with Ireland), and the governance of the 
withdrawal agreement, as well as the pace of the 
negotiations. It compares these discussions with the 
negotiations on the same set of issues in the accession 
talks, before outlining the policy implications of this 
comparison for both the Brexit and the accession 
negotiations.  
Reciprocal rights of residents 
The main negotiations in the Brexit case seem to focus 
on the rights of EU citizens who have settled in the UK 
Executive Summary 
The accession process and Brexit largely deal with 
the same issues. A comparison allows for assessing 
EU consistency across the two cases:   
> First, the EU’s decision to act in unity for the 
rights of EU residents in the UK is a display of 
solidarity, and should be acknowledged as 
such.  
> Second, if the four freedoms of the single 
market are seen as indivisible in Brexit 
negotiations, this should also be the case in 
accession talks. 
> Third, a solution to the border regulation in 
Northern Ireland may be inspired by the Annan 
Plan for the reunification of Cyprus. This would 
mean applying some parts of EU law to 
Northern Ireland.  
> Fourth, regarding the governance of the 
withdrawal agreement, inspiration can be 
taken from the association agreements. The 
Court of Justice of the EU and the Commission 
could have a stronger role for dispute 
settlement in the fields of residents’ rights and 
EU law. Conversely, a Joint Committee with the 
right of deferral to arbitration or to another 
dispute settlement mechanism could deal with 
other issues in the withdrawal agreement.  
> Finally, while the accession process can take as 
long as needed for the candidate country to 
adopt all EU rules, the exit process has a fixed 
deadline. This should be handled responsibly.  
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and the rights of UK nationals settled in the rest of the 
EU. Judged by the current state of the debate, the final 
regulations on the rights of EU citizens in the UK and 
those of British citizens in the EU will be similar. The 
Guidelines Following the Notification of the United 
Kingdom under Article 50 TEU (European Council 2017) 
state that ‘throughout the negotiations the Union will 
maintain its unity and act as one with the aim of 
reaching a result that is fair and equitable for all 
member states and in the interests of its citizens’.  
The experience of accession negotiations demonstrates 
that EU member states may have different preferences 
regarding possible transition periods for the free 
movement of the citizens of new member state(s). This 
differentiation actually caters for the national needs of 
each member state to be taken into consideration 
against possible migratory flows from the incoming 
country. However, if this differentiated logic was 
extended to a withdrawal agreement, then different 
reciprocal rights could be foreseen for the citizens of 
each EU member state. This might well be to the 
detriment of some, especially newer, member states. 
The EU has therefore chosen to act as a bloc on this 
issue, not allowing negotiations between the UK and 
individual member states. This is a sign of concrete 
solidarity among the member states. If maintained and 
concluded successfully, this experience should be 
explicitly presented as a success in protecting national 
interests collectively within the EU. 
Consistency of principles regarding the single market 
The UK’s desire to maintain access to the single market 
without allowing for the free circulation of labour is 
criticised as ‘cherry-picking’ by the EU. The first 
principle stated in the Guidelines (European Council 
2017) is that there will be no sector-by-sector approach 
to the single market and that its four freedoms are 
indivisible. This entails that the British government will 
not be allowed to pick and choose.  
Inversely, ‘cherry-picking’ regarding the single market 
does exist in the accession negotiations. For instance, 
the Negotiating Framework for Turkey states that 
‘derogations, specific arrangements or permanent 
safeguard clauses on free movement of persons may be 
considered’ in the case of Turkey joining the Union 
(Council of the European Union 2005). In this case, the 
Council thus allows for EU ‘cherry-picking’ regarding the 
four basic freedoms of the single market to be enjoyed 
by the citizens of a new member state.  
If the single market is an indivisible whole, as is argued 
in the Brexit negotiations, the same logic should be 
applied to the accession negotiations and for both sides 
at the table. This is particularly important if the EU 
wishes to be consistent and preserve the homogeneity 
of its single market and the non-discrimination of its 
citizens. In the EU-Turkey negotiations on the free 
movement of persons in particular, the EU should be 
reminded about this need for consistency of its 
principles.  
Territorial and border problems 
In accession negotiations, the resolution of territorial 
problems and border issues is considered as very 
significant. Good neighbourly relations equally play a 
major role, as the EU wants to avoid importing political 
problems by being dragged into regional conflicts or 
endangering its prospective relations with the new 
neighbours. Nonetheless, some EU membership 
candidates have witnessed a ‘nationalisation’ of 
enlargement policy, as countries like Serbia, FYROM and 
Turkey were taken hostage by disputes with one of the 
member states, which either vetoed or threatened to 
veto any progress in the accession process unless a 
solution was found (Hillion 2010).   
The UK does not have outstanding disputes with any of 
the member states that could hinder its relationship 
with the Union. The EU has granted Ireland, Spain 
(regarding Gibraltar) and Cyprus (in relation to the UK’s 
sovereign base areas on the island) separate 
negotiating rights with the UK to regulate their future 
border management. The experience of the Western 
Balkan candidates and Turkey shows that sensitive 
relations with an EU member state can be problematic 
for taking the accession process further. Similar 
deadlocks with Ireland in the Brexit case could render 
the UK’s negotiations with the EU difficult. Among the 
three abovementioned cases, the preservation of the 
Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK, the 
rights of persons residing in these areas as well as 
avoiding a new ‘hard’ border will be significant aspects 
of the withdrawal agreement. British negotiators have 
to realise that the Republic of Ireland holds a veto right 
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over any future relationship of the UK with the EU. This 
already resulted in a similar ‘nationalisation’ of the 
negotiations on the withdrawal agreement. Therefore, 
the preservation of the Good Friday Agreement and a 
mutually satisfactory agreement on the regulation of 
the border is of vital importance for both Ireland and 
the UK.  
The Guiding Principles on Dialogue on Ireland/Northern 
Ireland (European Commission 2017a) state that 
‘North-South cooperation between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland is a central part of the Good Friday 
Agreement … [, which] is embedded in the common 
framework of European Law policies … the fact that the 
EU law ceases to apply in the United Kingdom after its 
withdrawal might impact continued cooperation and 
[…] specific provisions [may] need to be inserted in the 
Withdrawal Agreement’. This situation very much 
resembles the derogations from EU law that were 
envisaged in the Annan Plan for the Comprehensive 
Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, in case a united 
Cyprus had joined the EU in 2004. In that case, 
provisions were foreseen to regulate the residential 
rights of EU (especially Greek) and Turkish citizens in 
Northern Cyprus. If the Annan Plan had been adopted 
as a result of the 2004 referenda, there would also have 
been certain derogations from EU law in Northern 
Cyprus.  
This example can provide inspiration for the case of 
Northern Ireland, that is, certain parts of EU law could 
be made applicable to Northern Ireland and its border. 
This situation would be facilitated by the fact that 
Northern Ireland voted ‘Remain’ in the Brexit 
referendum. Nevertheless, the fact that Prime Minister 
May’s government needs the support of the Democratic 
Unionist Party complicates this possible solution, as 
evidenced by that party’s recent veto to a similar 
compromise. 
Governance of the withdrawal agreement   
The EU mandate for the Brexit negotiations foresees 
that for the transition period the withdrawal agreement 
should ‘set up an institutional structure to ensure an 
effective enforcement of the commitments under the 
agreement’, and ‘appropriate institutional 
arrangements to adopt measures for unforeseen 
situations not covered in the Agreement’. It should also 
include provisions relating to the overall governance of 
the Agreement to ensure settlement of disputes and 
enforcement of the Agreement. The jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the supervisory 
role of the Commission should be maintained (Council 
of the European Union 2017) in matters relating to 
‘continued application of Union law, citizens’ rights and 
applications and interpretation of other provisions of 
the agreement such as the financial settlement or 
measures adopted by the institutional structure to deal 
with unforeseen situations’. 
These negotiating directives indicate that the EU 
envisages non-judicial enforcement mechanisms in the 
withdrawal agreement that are similar to the ones that 
exist in its various types of ‘association’ relationships.  
The EU’s Position Paper on Governance states that a 
‘Joint Committee’ should be established to enforce the 
provisions of the withdrawal agreement that do not 
relate to citizens’ rights or the continued application of 
EU law. On these other provisions, the Joint Committee 
will be able to adopt appropriate measures to 
implement the withdrawal agreement and find a 
solution to a dispute at hand (European Commission 
2017b).  
This ‘non-judicial solution of disputes’ is similar to the 
provisions of the association agreements that designate 
the Association Council for Turkey or the Stabilisation 
and Association Councils for the Western Balkan 
countries as the first place to handle the disputes 
regarding the agreement. This non-judicial, but 
political, mechanism for the settlement of disputes 
requires that the parties of the dispute actually settle it 
themselves. The need for unanimity in the decision-
making process generally leads to an impasse. 
In the case of Turkey, the Association Council may either 
resolve the issue itself, or decide to send the case to the 
CJEU, or to another court or to arbitration. Visa and 
residence issues of Turkish citizens resulting from the 
implementation of the Ankara Agreement and customs 
union regulations, for instance, have either been settled 
in the national courts of relevant EU countries or in the 
CJEU. For the Free Trade Areas to be developed 
according to the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements with Serbia and Montenegro, WTO dispute 
settlement mechanisms are also foreseen as an 
additional way of dispute settlement. Since settlement 
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rights and the continued application of EU law will stem 
from the withdrawal agreement, a role for the CJEU 
would be appropriate. For the rest of the issues in the 
withdrawal agreement,  a Joint Committee or Council 
that has a right of deferral to arbitration or any other 
dispute settlement mechanism can be sufficient. 
The pace of the negotiations and their end result 
The EU is very reluctant in its negotiating frameworks 
for accession negotiations to state the prospective 
accession date of candidate countries to the Union. 
Rather, it frequently reiterates the open-ended nature 
of accession talks. In its prelude, the Negotiating 
Framework for Serbia merely states that ‘the 
negotiations are aimed at Serbia integrally adopting the 
EU acquis and ensuring its full implementation and 
enforcement’ (Council of the European Union 2014). 
Only the second paragraph of this negotiating 
framework states that ‘the shared objective of the 
negotiations is accession’. Quite in contrast to this logic, 
which foresees a complex ‘package deal’ before the 
accession can take place, the UK will be exiting the 
Union independently of whether a deal is reached or 
not.  
However, the EU seems to adopt a unilateral approach 
to negotiations in both cases. In the Brexit case, the EU 
refuses to speak about the future relationship treaty 
before a basic understanding is reached on the 
withdrawal agreement. The second phase of the 
negotiations is likely to foresee a transition period after 
the withdrawal date. The treaty with the UK on its 
future relationship with the EU can only be signed after 
the UK becomes a third country. Brexit negotiations 
preclude package deals on the withdrawal agreement 
and the agreement on the future relationship between 
the EU and a ‘third country’ UK. This makes it technically 
difficult for especially the British negotiators to see the 
whole picture for the talks ahead, and slows down the 
pace of the negotiations.  
At the start of all accession negotiations, it is stressed 
that progress depends on the merits and pace of the 
candidate country. As in the cases of Turkey and 
FYROM, the enlargement talks can take decades, even 
though the stalling of the process in these two cases 
cannot be blamed on these countries alone. If accession 
negotiations or the ratification of the final treaty fail, 
this will lead to the status quo ante, which is not the 
case for the ‘way out’. According to Article 50 of the 
Treaty on European Union, the exit process has a solid 
deadline that leaves the parties with unregulated and 
unforeseeable consequences if the negotiations are not 
completed on time. This should push all parties to 
complete the withdrawal agreement and the relevant 
transitional arrangements in a responsible manner to 
allow for timely ratification. 
Conclusions and recommendations  
The British government has called for more ‘imaginative 
and creative’ talks on Brexit, but it can be expected that 
the EU will be very much driven by its decades-long 
experience of EU accession negotiations. Based on the 
historical insights, this policy brief makes the following 
recommendations for the Brexit talks:  
- If the EU maintains its unified stance in the 
negotiations on the reciprocal rights of British and EU 
residents to guarantee similar rights for all EU citizens 
in the UK, this should be celebrated as the triumph of 
European solidarity to preserve national interests 
collectively. Alternatively, if the member states were 
divided and conducted their own talks, this would bear 
the risk of being to the detriment of the citizens of some 
member states. 
- Derogations foreseen in the Annan Plan for the 
Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem can, 
if mirrored onto the Brexit case, inspire a solution that 
would allow certain elements of EU law to be valid in 
Northern Ireland. This solution would be facilitated by 
the fact that Northern Ireland voted ‘Remain’. 
- A role for the CJEU with a supervisory role for the 
Commission would be appropriate regarding the 
preservation of the residential rights and oversight of 
EU law foreseen in the withdrawal agreement. As a 
dispute resolution mechanism for other issues a Joint 
Committee or Council that has a right of deferral to 
arbitration may be sufficient. 
- Exit negotiations are not open-ended like accession 
negotiations. Eventually with or without a deal, the UK 
exits from the Union by the deadline date, unless there 
is a unanimous decision to prolong the process. 
Whereas ‘no deal’ means the status quo ante for 
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candidates, it has unforeseeable consequences for the 
EU and the UK.  
Lastly, this policy brief advances two recommendations 
for the accession talks in light of how the EU presents 
itself in the Brexit negotiations: 
- If the single market is an indivisible whole, as is argued 
by the EU in the Brexit negotiations, and if no cherry-
picking is allowed about its four basic freedoms, then 
this principle should also apply in accession 
negotiations. This consistency is about the integrity of 
the EU’s character. Accession country negotiators 
should not hesitate to remind the EU of this whenever 
necessary. 
- Similar to the deadlock in accession negotiations, the 
negotiations on the UK’s withdrawal agreement have 
gained a ‘nationalised’ character with relevance to the 
Irish border problem. A detailed analysis of this process 
could possibly inspire new perspectives for some 
candidate countries, like Turkey, FYROM and others, to 
overcome the deadlocks for the ‘nationalised’ problems 
in their accession processes.   
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